

**ALERT** FEBRUARY 2026



# DUBAI PROPERTIES LINKED TO HEMEDTI



THE SENTRY

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Mohamed 'Hemedti' Hamdan Dagalo, the leader of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF), is closely linked to a \$1.7 million property portfolio in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), according to real estate records uncovered by The Sentry.<sup>1</sup> The brutal RSF militia have been at war with the Sudanese Armed Forces since 2023, leading to the deaths of more than 100,000 people.<sup>2</sup> Hemedti has been sanctioned by the United States, which has accused the RSF of genocide in Western Sudan's Darfur region.<sup>3</sup> His linkages to multiple properties stands in stark contrast to the homelessness the war has inflicted on Sudan: 12 million people—a quarter of Sudan's population—had fled their homes as of January 2026.<sup>4</sup>


In March 2020, Hemedti bought three apartments in Dubai's eastern suburbs, close to the UAE's Al Minhad military airbase. The properties were first bought in his own name and then sold in July 2022 to Prodigious Real Estate Management Supervision Services ("Prodigious"), registered in the UAE.<sup>5</sup> The past and present directors and owners of Prodigious are closely linked to other companies sanctioned for their connections to the RSF. Prodigious is currently 100% owned by Abo Zer Abdelnabi Habiballa Ahmmed, also known as Abozer Habib.<sup>6</sup> The US Treasury sanctioned Habib in 2025 as the owner of the Capital Tap group, which included companies that provided money and military equipment to the RSF.<sup>7</sup> Former owners and directors of Prodigious—namely, Emirati businessman Naser Helal Abdulla Helal Alhammedi and Sudanese national Islam Badreldin Mohamed Abdalla—also used to own companies in the Capital Tap group.<sup>8</sup> Prodigious, Habib, Alhammedi, and Abdalla did not respond to requests for comment.



TOP: Mohamed 'Hemedti' Hamdan Dagalo, the current leader of Sudan's RSF militia. *AP Images*. BOTTOM: Map of Dubai showing the approximate location of properties linked to Hemedti.

### Connected by Sanctions

Prodigious Real Estate Management Supervision Services has direct and indirect links to sanctioned persons and entities, including its current owner.



We estimate the three properties to be worth just under \$1 million.<sup>9</sup> Prodigious also owns a commercial property in Dubai, worth about \$670,000.<sup>10</sup> The tenant of that property was an interior design company formerly owned by Alhammadi and Mazin Fadlalla. Fadlalla's role as a suspected frontman for the RSF was revealed by The Sentry in 2025.<sup>11</sup> Between 2023 and 2025, Prodigious earned at least \$80,000 per year in rent from this portfolio.<sup>12</sup>

The Sentry found the properties in a database of leaked Dubai property records from 2020 and 2022 first obtained by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), an American non-profit organization. An investigative journalism outfit, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), helped obtain information that confirmed the current role played by Prodigious.

The property purchases shed further light on the RSF's relationship with the UAE. The UAE adamantly denies supporting the RSF.<sup>13</sup> However, this investigation into the property portfolio linked to Hemedti is the third Sentry report that reveals the intricate connections between the Dagalo family, the RSF, and the UAE. The first publication detailed how RSF front companies, including those run by Alhammadi, Abdalla and Habib, operated out of Dubai.<sup>14</sup> The second revealed that the Emirati businessman supplying Colombian mercenaries to train the RSF is the business partner of the UAE's most senior bureaucrat.<sup>15</sup> Investigations by others have found that the UAE supplies weapons and drones to the RSF, while smuggled gold flows in the other direction.<sup>16</sup> Emirati support for the RSF stems from the very top, including ruler Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed and his brothers, Shiekh Mansour and Sheikh Tahnoun, according to the New York Times.<sup>17</sup>

## Dubai's property market

The UAE's property market has attracted dirty money due to a 'few questions asked' approach by real estate agents and lawyers, which allows buyers to transfer ill-gotten gains into clean assets relatively easily.<sup>18</sup> In 2024, undercover reporters posing as potential property buyers were told they could pay in "bags of cash," and that they would face "zero question(s)" about the source of their funds.<sup>19</sup> Journalists have located properties owned by corrupt politicians, drug traffickers, money launderers, terrorist financiers, and individuals sanctioned for helping Syria's chemical weapons program during President Assad's regime.<sup>20</sup>

Despite this reputation, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) took the UAE off its so-called "grey list," which includes jurisdictions whose anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism regimes are deemed to have strategic deficiencies. When removing the UAE from the list, FATF cited increased numbers of suspicious transaction reports from sectors such as the real estate industry as one area of improvement.<sup>21</sup> Between 2013 and 2018, the UAE's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) received just three suspicious transaction reports from real estate companies.<sup>22</sup> In contrast, from 2020 to 2023, the FIU received over 2,000 Real Estate Activity Reports, which are triggered by cash or crypto

### Can you help?

The Sentry believes that the Dagalo family may have significant property holdings in the UAE, possibly held via front companies. We appeal to members of the public to contact us securely via the methods detailed on our website: <https://thesentry.org/shareinfo/>

purchases.<sup>23</sup> However, there is little evidence that the UAE has launched a commensurate number of probes into properties potentially bought with dirty money, despite FATF noting in 2022 that the UAE had committed to "demonstrating a sustained increase in effective investigations and prosecutions of different types of ML [Money Laundering] cases consistent with UAE's risk profile."<sup>24</sup> In 2024, Transparency International (TI), an anti-corruption watchdog, investigated a sample of 100 politically exposed persons (PEPs) whose ownership of Dubai property was exposed by C4ADS in 2018. TI found that at least 58 still owned property in the city.<sup>25</sup> The UAE has also not extradited infamous suspects who seemingly control property in Dubai, such as the Gupta brothers, wanted by South Africa for 'state capture,' Isabel dos Santos, whose extradition is sought by Angola for defrauding the country of \$219 million, or Daniel Kinehan, an alleged drug smuggler from Ireland.<sup>26</sup>

## Recommendations

**Sanctions.** Prodigious Real Estate Management Supervision Services is already blocked in the US under the Office of Foreign Assets Control's 50% rule, as the US has previously sanctioned the company's sole owner, Abo Zer Abdelnabi Habiballa Ahmmed. However, US authorities should specifically identify Prodigious as a blocked entity and add the company to the Specially Designated Nationals & Blocked Persons list for clarity and maximum effectiveness. Authorities in the European Union, United Kingdom, and other jurisdictions should investigate and, if appropriate, sanction Prodigious and its sole owner Abo Zer Abdelnabi Habiballa Ahmmed.

**Enhanced due diligence.** In all jurisdictions, and especially in the UAE, financial institutions, real estate professionals, and lawyers should conduct enhanced due diligence on customers and transactions potentially

involving members of the Dagalo family and Prodigious Real Estate Management Supervision Services. These institutions and persons should in particular investigate any payments to or from Prodigious Real Estate Management Supervision Services, in case the payments breach US sanctions imposed on Hemedti in 2025.

**Investigating real estate transactions in the UAE.** Law enforcement agencies should investigate all properties bought by Prodigious Real Estate Management Supervision Services, the Dagalo family, and other related PEPs to verify the source of funds.

**Increased FATF evaluations of real estate.** FATF members should focus on real estate during the upcoming 2026 mutual evaluation of the UAE's progress on enforcement of money laundering and terrorist financing laws. If further progress in this area is not observed, then FATF should place the UAE back on the grey list.

## Endnotes

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  - 6 Summary of Prodigious Real Estate Management Supervision Services corporate data, February 12, 2025, reviewed by The Sentry.
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