April 2026
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In the first five months of 2025, three large military convoys—including Russian-made trucks, tanks, armored cars, and boats—reached Mali’s capital city, Bamako. These deliveries came amidst a difficult period for Russian forces in Mali. The Wagner Group, whose paramilitary fighters have been present in the country since the end of 2021, had not only failed to achieve any significant battlefield successes in central and northern Mali; they had also failed to gain access to the country’s lucrative gold mining sector. For most of their deployment, they appear to have been paid directly by Moscow, as revealed in The Sentry’s “Mercenary Meltdown” investigation, while committing atrocities against Malian civilians. The Wagner Group announced its withdrawal from Mali in June 2025, largely handing over operations to the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps.
These new weapons deliveries suggest that the Russian government is doubling down on Mali, despite the concurrent withdrawal—and multiple failures—of the Wagner Group. Though the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) claimed the equipment was sent to support the national military, most of it was intended to be used by nascent Africa Corps bases and fighters, sources in Bamako confirmed to The Sentry. The composition of the convoy suggests that Moscow is adopting a more risk-averse stance and prioritizing the protection of Africa Corps troops, as opposed to Wagner’s historically aggressive and forward-leaning approach. Beyond Mali, Russia is also increasing diplomatic engagement, providing direct military support to Sahelian leaders, and creating a strategic hub that would allow it to move with ease and project power across West Africa. The Guinea Conakry port terminal, which is operated by Russian-Guinean companies Alumina Company of Guinea (ACG-Fria) and Compagnie des Bauxites de Kindia (Kindia Bauxite Company or CBK), facilitated the aforementioned military deliveries—the port has become Russia’s gateway to the Sahel. Guinea, as well as Mali, is an integral part of Russia’s broader ambitions for influence across West Africa. With Africa Corps troops also deployed to Niger, Sudan, and Libya, the breadth of Russia’s military engagement around the region warrants scrutiny.
When the Africa Corps first deployed in Mali at the end of 2024, it appeared that the group would be an iteration, or a rebranding, of the Wagner Group in this context. This is to some extent true. The Africa Corps has roughly the same number of troops as Wagner, and many of them are former Wagner fighters. Some core leadership remains the same. However, the hierarchical structure of the Africa Corps and its direct ties to the Russian state apparatus, as well as the Africa Corps’ response to the most recent militant-imposed fuel blockade, reveal fundamental differences in how the force operates compared to Wagner. In other words, the change is not just cosmetic. Instead of using military inroads to gain mining concessions, as Wagner tried to do in Mali and successfully did in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Africa Corps is now first using Russian and Guinean businesses for its military purposes. Two subsidiaries of the Russian company United Company Rusal (UC Rusal) are supporting Moscow’s war effort, signaling that Russian businesses are facilitators of Africa Corps operations in West Africa.
As Russia doubles down on—and potentially expands—its military presence in the Sahel, Malian civilians continue to pay the price. Recent reports confirm increasing incidents of Africa Corps-perpetrated rape, torture, beheadings, mutilation, and summary executions, especially across northern Mali and the border with Mauritania. In response, sanctioning authorities in the United States (US), the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, and Australia should sanction those companies that support the Russian war effort in the Sahel and monitor countries and other companies that could be facilitating Russia’s advances in the region.