October 2025
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A team of businessmen with ties to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia set up a network of companies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) including jewelers, an interior design business, and a management consultancy.
While seven of the firms have already been publicly identified and sanctioned, The Sentry has identified five key individuals behind the corporate structures, as well as hitherto unreported entities they have set up, that merit further scrutiny and investigation.
One of these individuals, Mazin Fadlalla, previously bought hundreds of Toyotas for the RSF to convert to “technicals,” pickup trucks with mounted machine guns. The involvement of Fadlalla and others in four Dubai-based gold companies provides a glimpse into the conflict gold supply chain: smuggled out of western Sudan, imported into the UAE, and then sold on to international markets.
In the years before the war in Sudan began in 2023, the RSF and its leaders diversified their business interests into a wide array of economic sectors. As the war has progressed, however, the militia has become more reliant on a narrower business model, with gold mining playing a vital role. Within that model, the RSF needs corporate vehicles and banks to turn smuggled gold into hard currency. Revealing the identities of the men behind these companies will enable banks, gold refineries, and governments to investigate and, if merited, halt future transactions in which Fadlalla and others are involved.
Recommendations
European Union, United States, and United Kingdom
Sanctions authorities should investigate Mazin Gamareldin Mohamed Fadlalla and his companies, including Aoun Commercial Brokers, and, if appropriate, designate them for sanctions under the Sudan country or other appropriate programs. It is unclear whether Fadlalla currently provides support to the RSF, but there are reasonable grounds to suspect that he has supported the RSF’s operations in the recent past. First, in 2019, he helped buy hundreds of Toyota vehicles commonly used by the militia—a procurement effort that was carried out through Tradive General Trading, which was exposed in the media that same year as being a front for the RSF. Fadlalla was also the shareholder of three companies that were subsequently sanctioned for their links to the RSF: Tradive, GSK Advanced Business, and Al Jil Alqadem General Trading. Finally, Fadlalla owned a significant stake in Aoun, which sold car parts to GSK Advanced Business just before the war broke out in 2023.
Sanctions authorities should investigate companies with active business licenses that have Ahmed Hashim Hamad El Basher, Naser Helal Abdulla Helal Al Hammadi, or Essa Mohammed Rashed Saif Al Marri listed as either a director or a shareholder in order to ascertain whether the RSF exercises any control over these entities or if they are owned or controlled by sanctioned persons. Given Hashim, Alhammadi, and Almarri’s past links to RSF-supporting companies, there are grounds to investigate the companies they run. Hashim denies any current involvement with the RSF. However, in the past he was linked to GSK Advanced Business, and he is a current shareholder in Aoun Commercial Brokers. While Almarri is a frequent nominee director and shareholder for a range of clients, his status as owner of Tradive and Al Zumoroud and Al Yaqoot Gold & Jewellers Trading, both of which were subsequently sanctioned for their links to the RSF, and his role as co-owner of several companies with Fadlalla mean that his presence on the board of an entity is a risk factor that may indicate RSF links. Alhammadi owned Capital Tap Holding and its related companies for several years until January 2024. During that period, his firms had a close commercial relationship with RSF-linked companies such as Al Junaid and GSK Advanced Business.
Sanctions authorities in the EU, US, and UK should review their current designations related to RSF individuals and entities and consider whether there are any gaps in sanctioning between jurisdictions that should be addressed to ensure maximum impact.
Banks and commercial counterparts in the gold supply chain
Banks should conduct enhanced due diligence when handling transactions for companies set up by Fadlalla, Hashim, Alhammadi, or Almarri to guard against the possibility that the RSF may be involved in these companies via proxy directors.
Banks and companies in the gold supply chain should conduct enhanced due diligence when handling transactions involving Fadlalla, Hashim, Alhammadi, and Almarri to ascertain whether they are providing material support to the RSF or any sanctioned person and whether the RSF or any sanctioned person still exercises any control over entities related to them.
Know more? The Sentry is still researching the RSF’s financial networks. If you have more information, please share securely via https://thesentry.org/shareinfo/